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Abstract
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Government began 
improving security in large population centers and near potential high-
value terrorist targets. Included in these efforts was the development of a 
more robust border security program, with an emphasis on reducing the 
threat of terrorist infiltration at America's borders. However, nearly a 
decade after 9/11, terrorism and organized crime continue to pose 
significant threats to the United States. As many of these threats emanate 
from other nations, improved border security helps mitigate these 
threats. This article summarizes known terrorist activity along the U.S. 
northern and southern borders, and highlights the threat of organized 
crime in the southwest border region. Furthermore, it analyzes current 
border security efforts and identifies key deficiencies in the system. 
Finally, it provides a tool kit for future border security endeavors that 
center on developing a larger but more coordinated and nimble border 
security force, driven by intelligence, and supported by proven 
technologies and tactical infrastructure.
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Introduction
Few topics in American public discourse are as controversial as border 
security and illegal immigration. Presently, notions of "traditional" illegal 
immigration dominate the debate. News agencies and advocacy groups 
focus primarily on the movement of workers from Mexico or Central/
South America into the United States. However, mixed within this ele-
ment are sophisticated intercontinental criminal networks comprised of 
drug cartels, human smugglers, and gangs that stretch from America's 
southern border to Central and South America to Africa and Europe. Not 
only are these networks responsible for the raging drug war in Mexico, 
but they also pose a significant threat to U.S. citizens and law enforce-
ment living and working along the border. Additionally, their connections 
with U.S.-based criminal groups directly contribute to criminal activity in 
America.1
Furthermore, there is growing concern over the expansion of Islamic 
extremism in the Western world. Evidence suggests that there is a signifi-
cant presence of anti-American Islamic groups operating in the Ameri-
cas.2 Every year, federal, state, and local agencies catch thousands of 
special interest aliens (SIA)—individuals who originate from special inter-
est countries (SIC) identified by the U.S. Government to harbor and/or 
otherwise support international terrorism—fueling concerns that extrem-
ists are increasingly utilizing existing illegal networks to move operatives 
and materials into the United States.3 From the numerous SIA encoun-
ters and the seizures of jihadist materials along the southwest border, it 
appears that SIA's travel from countries overseas to Central and South 
America, and then attempt to infiltrate America's borders illegally. The 
northern border is not immune to these infiltrations, either. Beyond the 
threat emanating from the U.S./Mexico border, there are al-Qaida-linked 
cells and grassroots extremist groups operating in Canada. Several previ-
ous terrorist plots involved jihadists illegally crossing the Canadian bor-
der either to plot attacks or to recruit and fundraise.4
The United States has made significant strides in improving border secu-
rity following 9/11. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), born 
out of the aftermath of these events, has over the past nine years pursued 
critical improvements in airport security and customs enforcement. 
While some security enhancements have been made, notably at the Cus-
toms and Border Patrol (CBP), a component of DHS, security between 
border checkpoints remains insufficient; and limited resources leave the 
overwhelming majority of U.S. borders vulnerable.5 While it is impossible 
to completely secure America's borders, officials should pursue several 
key improvements. First, the homeland security workforce should be con-
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tinually developed into a highly skilled and nimble force. Second, the 
workforce should be led by coordinated and actionable intelligence and 
supported by advanced tools and technologies. Finally, intelligence must 
be available to and leveraged by existing state and local law enforcement 
agencies.
Understanding the Threat at America's Borders
Security controls and policies at America's borders enable the flow of mil-
lions of people and facilitate the transactions of billions of dollars of legal 
commerce each year. However, intertwined with everyday legal activities 
exists a complex tapestry of sophisticated illegal enterprises vying to 
exploit America's porous borders. Along the U.S./Mexico border, drug 
cartels, human smugglers, kidnapping rings, thieves, and gangs contrib-
ute to an increasingly dangerous environment for citizens and law 
enforcement of both countries. Deteriorating border security environ-
ments, created in part by the brutal drug war raging in Mexico to the 
south and the lax security posture along the U.S./Canadian border to the 
north, provide openings for international terrorist groups and criminal 
enterprises to fundraise, recruit, and plan attacks.6 As a result, terrorists 
who have operated in Canada, such as Ghazi Ibrahim, Abu Mezer, Lafi 
Khalil, Ahmed Ressam, and the "Toronto 18" exemplify the shared secu-
rity risk for both Canada and the United States.
The Growing Threat of Organized Crime along the 
Southwest Border
The single greatest driving force affecting the security environment along 
the U.S./Mexico border is organized crime, and, more specifically, Mex-
ico's violent drug war. Operating throughout the U.S./Mexico border 
region is a web of sophisticated illegal organizations that leverage well-
established networks to move goods and people across America's borders. 
These groups include drug cartels, human smugglers, gun smugglers, kid-
nappers, gangs, and thieves.
The drug cartels are by far the most sophisticated, utilizing advanced mil-
itary weaponry, state of the art technology, and paramilitary tactics.7 
These cartels and their enforcers wield substantial power and control key 
routes into the United States, as well as vast territories in Mexico. For 
years the cartels have used bribes and intimidation to corrupt thousands 
of government officials and exert authority. According to Mexico's Public 
Safety Secretary, Genaro Garcia Luna, in 2010 drug cartels paid around 
$100 million dollars a month in bribes to municipal police officers across 
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Mexico to ensure that their activities went undisturbed.8 The corruption 
reached epidemic levels. While the government maintained control over 
much of Mexico City, eventually the outlying regions in Mexico effectively 
fell under the control of the cartels.
The drug war problem started in 2006 when more than 2,000 people died 
in Mexico at the hands of the drug cartels.9 In response, the Mexican mil-
itary and federal police launched an offensive to weaken their organiza-
tions, bring drug-related violence down, and root out government 
corruption. However, the drug war progressed and the death toll esca-
lated as the cartels turned to more extreme measures to protect their turf 
and their shipments. As Mexican authorities weakened one organization, 
others rushed in to fill the vacuum. Soon two wars were being fought: one 
between rival cartels over highly lucrative drug turf and another between 
the cartels and the government.10 By 2008, the number of homicides 
more than doubled; and in 2010, Mexico experienced more than 11,000 
drug-related homicides.11 In total, more than 28,000 crime-related 
deaths have occurred in Mexico since the beginning of the drug war in 
2006.12 Included among the dead are more than 915 municipal police 
officers, 698 state police, and 463 federal agents.13
As the drug war continues, the cartels have increasingly turned to more 
devastating weapons, such as high-powered assault rifles, fragmentation 
grenades, incendiary grenades, Molotov cocktails, and improvised explo-
sive devices in attacks on government officials. Once an isolated threat, 
violence is now present in most regions of Mexico, with the vast majority 
occurring in areas along the U.S./Mexico border in states like Baja, Chi-
huahua, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. For example, in Ciudad Juarez, 
located just across the border from El Paso, Texas, more than 6,500 peo-
ple have died since the beginning of 2008.14 At 191 homicides per 
100,000, Ciudad Juarez ranks as the most violent place in the western 
hemisphere.15
The violence is not restricted to Mexico. Murders and kidnappings on the 
U.S. side of the border have increased significantly over the past few 
years.16 Because of the increased pressure placed on the cartels by both 
Mexican and U.S. security officials, the cartels have escalated their tactics, 
and U.S. law enforcement increasingly experiences violent encounters 
with cartel members. Today, smugglers do not hesitate to confront law 
enforcement and often fire upon them with automatic weapons and 
engage in high-speed pursuits.17 Between October 2009 and March 2010, 
for example, 134 CBP agents were assaulted, a 45 percent increase over 
the 93 assaults CBP reported during the same period the prior year.18
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The cartels are incredibly adept at moving their shipments of drugs, uti-
lizing a number of methods to transport their cargo and evade detection. 
The cartel's solutions range from basic to highly sophisticated. Tunnels 
running from safe houses on both sides of the border are common. 
Between 2006 and 2010, law enforcement personnel uncovered 75 differ-
ent tunnels running underneath the U.S. border.19 In addition, drug 
smugglers have used ultra-light aircraft to carry illegal narcotics into the 
United States. Between September of 2009 and May of 2010, the CBP Air 
and Marine Operation Command (AMOC) identified more than 135 sus-
pected incursions using ultra-light aircraft.20 The cartels have also begun 
to use highly sophisticated semi-submersible boats to move large quanti-
ties of drugs. Other less sophisticated methods include traversing the 
desert on ATVs and motorcycles, cutting or destroying fences, floating 
narcotics across rivers, concealing drugs in vehicles or inside people's 
bodies, using dead drops in concealed areas, and bribing border officials 
to get through checkpoints.21
Impact of Mexican Organized Crime inside the United States
According to many law enforcement officials, there is growing intercon-
nectivity between Mexican drug cartels, human smuggling networks, and 
American gangs.22 While Mexican drug cartels are responsible for smug-
gling illicit goods across the border, gangs and criminal organizations 
often are distributors of the drugs throughout the United States.23 Large 
international street gangs like Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Mexican 
Mafia maintain a presence on both sides of the border and engage in 
smuggling as well as distribution.24 In fact, U.S. law enforcement in at 
least 28 states has reported catching MS-13 members engaged in drug 
distribution since record-keeping of such incidents began.25 In addition, 
motorcycle gangs like the Bandidos and Mongols maintain chapters 
throughout the southwestern U.S. and use allied groups to spread their 
narcotics northward.26 Even prison gangs and hundreds of localized 
street gangs distribute illicit goods in places throughout the country.
In 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice estimated that approximately 
30,000 gangs operated in the United States.27 While many of these gangs 
are not formally or directly linked to the drug cartels, their symbiotic 
relationship with them provides greater resources and capabilities that 
threaten law-abiding citizens and law enforcement officers. The gangs use 
the revenue provided by the distribution of narcotics to buy weapons and 
fund other criminal enterprises, such as kidnapping, racketeering, and 
property crime.28 Furthermore, the illicit markets fuel turf wars between 
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rival groups over lucrative drug territory. These battles often place the 
lives of innocent bystanders and place law enforcement officers in 
jeopardy.
The Growing Threat of Terrorism
In addition to the threat posed by organized crime along the southwest 
border, the threat of terrorist infiltration remains a critical concern at 
both the northern and southern borders. Each year, U.S. law enforcement 
agencies catch thousands of SIAs from SICs with known ties to terrorism 
attempting to cross the border.29 Many of these SIAs are smuggled into 
Central and South America and then illegally brought across America's 
southwest border. Meanwhile, the presence of Islamic extremists in Can-
ada highlights the threat of terrorism along America's northern border as 
well.30
Border Data to Track the Terrorist Threat
It is difficult to accurately quantify the true threat terrorists pose to Amer-
ican borders. Today, the primary statistic used by border security experts 
to evaluate the threat posed by terrorism is the number of Other than 
Mexicans (OTM) and SIAs encountered along the border. However, bas-
ing terrorist threat assessments on the number of OTMs and SIAs 
detained along the border is misleading. Not all SIAs are terrorists, and 
some individuals originating from non-special-interest countries could 
also pose a threat. It is unclear how many illegal aliens avoid capture, and 
therefore, just as difficult to define the number of SIAs entering the coun-
try each year.
Terrorism at the Southwest Border
History demonstrates that terrorists search for security gaps and invent 
creative ways to exploit them. In fact, terrorists rely on security weak-
nesses to operate effectively. International terrorist groups know that 
criminal organizations in Central and South America maintain well-
established networks that enable them to smuggle large quantities of nar-
cotics and people across America's southern border. Terrorists could use 
these illicit criminal networks to smuggle weapons, chemicals, biological 
contaminants, and/or explosives into the United States. As Zapata 
County, Texas Sheriff Sigifredo Gonzalez observed:
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"If smugglers can bring in tons of marijuana and cocaine at one 
time and can smuggle twenty–thirty persons at one time, one can 
just imagine how easy it would be to bring in two to three terror-
ists or their weapons of mass destruction…chances of apprehen-
sion are very slim."31
Terrorists also know that large segments of both the northern and south-
ern border remain relatively unsecured. It is a known fact that several 
radical international Islamic groups maintain significant operations in 
Central and South America and engage in money laundering, drug traf-
ficking, arms dealing, and other legitimate and illegitimate means to fun-
nel millions of dollars every year into the hands of transnational 
terrorists.32
Border Security: Successes and Deficiencies
Current State of Border Security
Balancing the need for security along America's borders with the eco-
nomic imperative of protecting the legitimate flow of trade and travel into 
the U.S. is a daunting challenge. CBP, as well as other state and federal 
agencies, has made significant strides over the past decade in improving 
their capabilities and leveraging minimal resources to meet these difficult 
challenges. Over the past four years, CBP nearly doubled the number of 
agents at its disposal, growing its ranks from approximately 11,000 agents 
in 2006 to more than 20,100 at the close of 2009.33 These figures effec-
tively make CBP the largest uniformed federal law enforcement agency in 
the country.34
In 2005, CBP adopted its current strategy, which places an emphasis on 
interdicting terrorists. The key objectives of this strategy are to: establish 
a probability of apprehending terrorists as they attempt to enter between 
ports of entry; deter illegal entries through improved enforcement; detect, 
apprehend, and deter smugglers; leverage smart border technology; and 
reduce border crime.35 Along the northern border, where the primary 
concerns are terrorist infiltration and smuggling, the CBP emphasizes the 
use of intelligence, liaison, and technology to bolster minimal levels of 
personnel. To maximize the northern border strategy, CBP reaches out to 
Canadian immigration and security agencies to improve coordination and 
enhance intelligence gathering through the use of various technologies, 
like cameras and remote sensors. The Integrated Border Enforcement 
Teams (IBET) focuses on sharing intelligence and coordinating opera-
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tions between American and Canadian forces. Along the Southern border, 
where illegal immigration and organized crime remain the key focus, CBP 
emphasizes personnel, equipment, and tactical infrastructure.
A critical component of CBP's border security effort is the Secure Border 
Initiative (SBI). Devised in late 2005, SBI was intended to help front-line 
assets secure America's land borders with Canada and Mexico by ensur-
ing the deployment of an integrated system that includes both tactical 
infrastructure and technology.36 However, DHS cancelled further invest-
ment in the costly "virtual fence" and has promised to roll out a more inte-
grated approach in future iterations.37
In addition to DHS and CBP, a number of other federal agencies support 
the border security mission. These agencies include ICE, the FBI, the 
ATF, the DEA, and the Coast Guard, among others. To prevent terrorism 
and battle criminal organizations, CBP joined with ICE's Anti-Smuggling 
Units to focus its intelligence and surveillance on known smuggling oper-
ations that traffic aliens from special interest nations, and developed joint 
operations to target high interest smuggling activities.38
Critical Deficiencies in the System
While CBP has made significant improvements to the nation's border 
security program over the past decade, significant deficiencies still exist. 
In fact, major swaths of America's northern and southern borders remain 
unsecured. One measure DHS uses to track their progress is the number 
of miles under "effective control." Effective control of an area occurs when 
the CBP is expected to apprehend a detected illegal border crosser.39 CBP 
is responsible for securing approximately 8,607 miles of U.S. northern 
and southern borders, including coastal sectors. As of May of 2009, DHS 
effectively controlled only 894 miles of border, comprised of 697 miles 
along the southwest border, 32 along the northern border, and 165 in the 
coastal regions.40 To adequately meet the primary goals outlined in its 
strategy to achieve and maintain effective control of U.S. borders, CBP 
must improve these numbers significantly.
One reason for the limited miles under effective control is the failure to 
implement a unified technological solution. The most recent attempt, 
SBInet, became the primary technological component of the SBI. Com-
monly referred to as "the virtual fence," SBInet is a series of networked 
cameras, sensors, radar systems, and communications equipment meant 
to detect intruders and facilitate rapid response.41 The program began in 
2006, and DHS intended to incrementally adopt the concept to cover 
approximately 6,000 miles of America's borders with Mexico and Can-
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 4, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss3/4
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.3.3</p>
Mitigating the Exploitation of U.S. Borders by Jihadists and Criminal Organizations
37
ada.42 However, DHS stopped work on the program in March of 2010. It 
was eventually cancelled in early 2011, due to alleged missed deadlines 
and cost overruns resulting from technical problems and program delays, 
leaving an already insufficient number of agents with considerably less 
support than originally intended.
Recommendations
Expand the CBP Ranks
For the Border Patrol to pursue its mission adequately, the U.S. Govern-
ment must provide additional funding to drastically improve the CBP's 
ability to recruit and train new agents. While the Border Patrol added 
more than 1,700 agents to its workforce in FY2009, more manpower is 
needed to provide even minimal security. Simply put, despite its large size 
relative to other U.S. law enforcement bodies, the CBP is understaffed for 
its mission and is therefore unable to effectively patrol the border, leaving 
sizable areas with little enforcement. While technology and physical barri-
ers can enhance security, without agents to guard a fence or respond to 
tripped sensors, these countermeasures amount to little more than a 
minor inconvenience to highly motivated criminals and international ter-
rorists. To meet its increasingly difficult demands, the CBP should set a 
goal to double its workforce over the next five years.
Reduce Agent Attrition Rates
In addition to recruiting and training additional agents, CBP must 
address its high rate of attrition. After dropping to just 4 percent in 2005, 
the CBP attrition rate jumped to about 10 percent in 2007.43 While the 
most recent data is unavailable, in 2009 the rate remained at 10.1 per-
cent.44 In 2003, the last time the attrition rate reached beyond 10 percent, 
the Director of CBP noted that agent attrition was "reaching crisis propor-
tions."45 According to the Director, the high rates of attrition at the time 
resulted from lack of job satisfaction, lack of upward mobility, poor work-
ing conditions, and low pay compared to other law enforcement with sim-
ilar positions. With the attrition rate reaching a similar level today, it is 
likely that many of these same factors persist.
Such high rates of attrition make it more difficult to expand the CBP and 
contribute to an overall lack of experience within the force. Put in simple 
terms, a 10 percent attrition rate means that CBP needs to recruit and 
train more than 2,000 additional agents each year just to maintain its 
current numbers. Furthermore, it takes time and advanced training to 
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replace the loss of a seasoned agent with a new recruit. To remedy this sit-
uation, CBP must work to provide additional opportunities for advance-
ment to retain career-minded individuals, provide improved working 
conditions wherever possible, increase CBP pay scales to the levels of 
other federal law enforcement agencies, and provide other incentives to 
promote the hiring and retention of CBP agents.
Leverage State and Local Law Enforcement
To enhance the reach and effectiveness of federal agents, the CBP must 
improve their coordination with local law enforcement and provide train-
ing and resources to state and local law enforcement agencies near the 
border. After all, even with significant increases in the CBP ranks, it is 
impractical for the federal government to effectively patrol thousands of 
miles of border alone. Furthermore, state and local law enforcement pos-
sess a unique understanding of the local area that can benefit federal 
operations.
Some argue that border security is solely a federal government responsi-
bility. This view came to the forefront in July of 2010, when the U.S. Gov-
ernment sued the State of Arizona to block the implementation of a 
controversial law (SB 1070) that required police officers to check the 
immigration status of individuals they approached for law enforcement 
purposes. In U.S. v. Arizona, the federal government argued that, under 
the Constitution, immigration enforcement is solely a federal matter.46 
However, state and local officials along the border have a vested interest 
in border security because they are often the most affected by the issues 
plaguing the borderlands. Like their federal counterparts, they are 
responsible for the safety and security of their citizens. In many of the 
more remote border areas, the lack of a federal presence compels state 
and local law enforcement to manage most border-related criminal mat-
ters on their own.47 When illegal immigrants cause property damage or 
steal vehicles to bring them across the border, or when drug cartel mem-
bers assault or kill someone, citizens call the local police. Unfortunately, 
many of these agencies lack the necessary resources to effectively patrol 
the hundreds or thousands of square miles under their control; partner-
ship with the federal government is a must.
Simply put, when the federal government is unable to properly protect the 
residents of a state or city from crime associated with illegal immigration, 
terrorism, and illegal border crossings, then that responsibility falls on 
the shoulders of state and local officials. In many ways, the passage of the 
immigration law in Arizona stemmed from a widespread perception that 
the federal government was not adequately addressing the concerns of 
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citizens living along the border. In July 2010, U.S. Representative (Ari-
zona) Gabrielle Giffords echoed that sentiment when she said:
"I am disappointed in the federal lawsuit against SB 1070 for the 
same reason I was disappointed when this bill became law…the 
supreme irony of the lawsuit is its premise that SB 1070 intrudes 
on the federal government's responsibility to enforce immigra-
tion laws. Had the federal government taken that responsibility 
seriously in the past, neither today's lawsuit nor the state law that 
prompted it would be necessary."48
Instead of creating an adversarial relationship with state and local gov-
ernments, the federal government should develop a partnership with 
these agencies built on mutual self-interest. After all, the local agencies 
can provide the manpower and local knowledge that the federal govern-
ment often lacks, while the federal government can provide the financial, 
materiel, and training support required at the local level.
Expand Anti-Corruption Efforts
As the ranks of border security personnel grow, law enforcement agencies 
must expand their anti-corruption efforts to keep pace. The overwhelm-
ing majority of CBP agents perform their duties with integrity and honor. 
Criminal organizations, however, are actively engaged in recruiting law 
enforcement to help avoid detection. As a result, isolated acts of corrup-
tion do occur. Between October 1, 2004 and March of 2010, 103 CBP 
officers were indicted or arrested on charges ranging from money laun-
dering and smuggling to conspiracy.49
Few things threaten security operations more than corruption. It tar-
nishes the image of law enforcement and severely impacts the effective-
ness of security measures. To combat this threat, CBP already employs a 
number of anti-corruption measures, such as background checks, poly-
graph examinations, behavioral and analytical research tools, agent train-
ing, and misconduct investigations.50 Despite these efforts, corruption 
still exists. So, while thorough screening practices and polygraph exami-
nations remain critical elements of any anti-corruption plan, CBP must 
continue to enhance its ability to identify and investigate incidents of cor-
ruption. In particular, law enforcement agencies should place a greater 
emphasis on expanding the scope and prevalence of joint anti-corruption 
task forces to root out corrupt law enforcement officers.
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Emphasize Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Technologies in the 
Near Term
In addition to drastically increasing the number of personnel dedicated to 
securing the border, the government must accelerate the deployment of 
advanced technologies to act as a force multiplier. Presently, border secu-
rity personnel employ a variety of technologies—ranging from simple, 
man-portable equipment like radios and night vision goggles—to vehicles 
and other high-tech solutions like sensors, helicopters, planes, unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), non-invasive detection equipment, and video sur-
veillance systems.
Recently, DHS began a new approach to procure proven off-the-shelf 
technologies to fill the void left by the failure of the SBInet program. This 
approach is necessary to reduce lead times for fielding new equipment 
and avoid costly failures like SBInet because policymakers must move 
swiftly to provide the resources that front-line assets desperately require. 
In dire demand is advanced surveillance equipment that can provide crit-
ical intelligence information, identify potential threats, display informa-
tion across a common operating picture, evaluate the size and scope of a 
threat, and track various threats until agents can respond.
In January of 2011, DHS issued a request for information (RFI) regarding 
currently existing surveillance systems capable of operating from fixed 
towers located at elevated sites.51 While it is unclear whether such a sys-
tem currently exists to meet DHS requirements, these proposed Inte-
grated Fixed Towers (IFT) could provide surveillance capabilities that 
span an area of about 25 miles deep by about 30 miles wide. Conceivably, 
if DHS were to link the cameras with a video-over-IP solution to enable 
real-time video, then command centers could orchestrate a response from 
miles away. While these technical systems have the potential to improve 
detection and ultimately apprehension, they are stationary, and therefore, 
limited in their ability to track targets over long distances.
UAVs, on the other hand, are proven, more versatile than fixed surveil-
lance, and have the added benefit of being currently available. Employed 
by the military all over the world, the Predator-B offers operationally 
proven capabilities for border security. Unlike smaller UAVs, the Preda-
tor-B can handle high winds and carry up to 850 pounds internally and 
3,000 pounds of sensors and equipment externally.52 With a speed of up 
to 240 knots and an ability to remain aloft for thirty-four hours, the Pred-
ator-B can fly long endurance surveillance missions and provide real-time 
feeds that cut through dense fog, cloud cover, or foliage to a central con-
trol center.53 More importantly, unlike IFTs, the Predator-B is a highly 
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mobile asset, useful for tracking threats over long distances and easily 
redeployable to adapt to changing operational requirements. While there 
are legal considerations involved with flying UAVs over American or Mex-
ican/Canadian territory, the areas where the UAVs would provide the 
most impact are remote, limiting privacy concerns.
Pursue Long-Term Development of New Technologies
While fielding existing and proven technologies is critical to providing 
assets that border security personnel need immediately, CBP cannot 
entirely abandon the development of new technologies. The failure of 
SBInet, for example, should not deter the government from pursuing 
newer technologies. Future initiatives should include forward deployable 
man-portable UAVs, ground-based drones, biometric scanners, and other 
sensors.
One technology nearing the testing phase is the "Mega Blimp" platform 
concept, which is conceivably able to stay aloft for weeks and provide 
unique surveillance and tracking capabilities. If fielded, these football-
field-sized Mega Blimps could offer considerable advantages over other 
UAV platforms. U.S. Army officials calculated that one Mega Blimp, for 
example, could provide the same functions as twelve advanced Reaper 
UAV drones.54 Northrop Grumman's version of the Mega Blimp, the Long 
Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle, can carry up to 2,500 pounds of 
data links, sensors, antennas, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) equip-
ment. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin's blimp, the Integrated Sensor IS 
Structure, can track the movement of people up to 185 miles away.55
Continue Development of Tactical Infrastructure in 
Targeted Areas
Tactical infrastructure consists of various types of security structures, 
such as physical barriers.56 While tactical infrastructure cannot provide 
effective control by itself, it does act as a deterrent and supports law 
enforcement operations by slowing illegal border crossers' ability to move 
or escape, thereby decreasing the time it takes for law enforcement to 
respond.57 Therefore, it is vital that CBP continue to employ and improve 
physical barriers to reroute traffic to provide longer time frames for inter-
diction, and continue to build roads and trails to enable quicker response.
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Improve Information Sharing among Federal, State, and 
Local Law Enforcement
The federal government should provide funding and guidance to state and 
local authorities for the development of intelligence capabilities and use 
of intelligence fusion centers to improve dissemination at all levels of gov-
ernment. It is often said that the default setting of any organization is not 
to share. Politics and interagency rivalry often further erode cooperation. 
Developing a system of true collaboration requires hard work, dedication, 
and trust; however, maintaining a focus on the shared mission at hand 
can help overcome many of the traditional turf battle issues. Improving 
this coordination not only provides federal authorities with additional 
sources of information, but also allows for quick dissemination of federal 
intelligence and greater opportunities for collaboration.
One concept developed to handle this process is the intelligence fusion 
center. Today, approximately fifty-eight intelligence fusion centers exist 
in the United States.58 Largely formed by state and local authorities in 
response to the attacks on 9/11, fusion centers facilitate information shar-
ing and operational planning by combining and exchanging data and 
intelligence from multiple sources and "fusing" it into more comprehen-
sive actionable intelligence.59 In theory, these fusion centers facilitate col-
laboration among disparate groups, provide a more comprehensive 
operating picture, and streamline dissemination. Use of these facilities 
varies, however, and many depend on state funding to operate. This leads 
to concerns that state governments may eliminate their fusion centers 
because of budget concerns under tough economic conditions.60
Although many fusion centers staff federal law enforcement agents, each 
fusion center develops its own standards, employs its own equipment, 
and sets its own priorities. This can create issues in coordinating between 
disparate centers and can slow down or even eliminate collaboration. 
Nevertheless, these fusion centers offer a unique opportunity for improv-
ing collaboration among federal, state, and local levels. Therefore, the fed-
eral government should provide additional funding to maintain these 
centers and push for standardization to improve interoperability and 
capability.
Develop Rapid Response Capabilities
Even with dramatic increases in personnel, it will remain impossible to 
man every mile of America's borders. As CBP fields advanced technolo-
gies to help surveil the border and detect and track intruders, the ability 
to respond quickly to threats is paramount. The federal government 
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should train local teams to work in coordination with border patrol assets 
to manage rapid response. Because of the different environments and ter-
rain along America's borders, response times, equipment, and training 
needed to accomplish these tasks will depend on the location. Different 
teams will need access to a broad array of technology, including helicop-
ters, speedboats, and ATVs to accomplish their mission.
Install Border Outposts in Remote High Threat Areas
Distance is a critical component of response time. In many areas, CBP 
posts exist miles behind geographic borders. Therefore, to limit the dis-
tance response forces must cover, CBP should create border patrol out-
posts in remote areas, closer to the border, to provide staging zones for 
operations and incident response. Manning these posts with a rotation of 
skilled rapid response teams would enable a quicker response and provide 
a primary layer of security. As law enforcement detects a threat, CBP 
could deploy assets from these advanced bases in coordination with assets 
located further behind the border. This type of security in depth limits the 
opportunity for evasion and increases the likelihood of interdicting 
threats.
Emphasize Intelligence Driven Surge Operations
The criminals and terrorists operating along the borders constantly evolve 
their tactics to avoid interdiction. They study the movement of law 
enforcement and work to find ways to exploit weaknesses in security 
plans. Therefore, it is critical that law enforcement continually adapts its 
tactics to stay ahead of the terrorists and criminals. Much like random 
security checks at airports, surge operations in areas where law enforce-
ment identifies a growing threat can introduce a greater level of uncer-
tainty in the minds of criminal planners.
Improve Coordination with Foreign Governments
Border patrol is not the first line of defense in border security, and CBP 
has worked over the past several years to improve coordination with for-
eign governments to help with shipping and security practices. Criminals 
and terrorists continue, however, to exploit weaker immigration controls 
in Central/South American nations to gain entry into the United States. It 
is vital the U.S. Government continue to forge security partnerships with 
nations in the Americas and provide guidance and support to these 
nations to improve their document controls, anti-corruption measures, 
and immigration standards.
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Emphasize Linguistic Skills and Training at the Southern 
Border
Because of the international nature of border security, CBP must increase 
the available pool of agents with advanced secondary language skills. This 
is particularly important along the southern border, where it is believed 
that foreign operatives are moving to Central and South America, adopt-
ing Latin American identities, and learning to speak Spanish before 
attempting to sneak across the border. Thus, CBP should engage in 
expanded linguistic training for Border Patrol agents, and place an 
emphasis on hiring agents with native Spanish-speaking ability that are 
better able to detect differences in dialect and identify SIAs posing as 
Latin Americans.
Conclusion
Immigration and border security remain hot-button political issues in 
American public discourse. Policymakers can no longer afford to avoid 
addressing America's growing border security threats. For too long Amer-
ica's border security efforts have placed emphasis on unproven technol-
ogy and relied solely on tactical infrastructure as the solutions to 
America's border security demands. While sensors and fences remain 
critical components of the overall border security strategy, they amount to 
very little without sufficient numbers of motivated and trained agents to 
rapidly respond to detected threats. As a result, today's border security 
posture has left federal, state, and local law enforcement overburdened 
and the majority of the U.S. border uncontrolled. While today's economic 
realities make procuring funds for any security endeavor more difficult, 
policymakers must act on their obligation to protect American citizens by 
enhancing border security measures. Simply put, in terms of national 
security priorities, none ranks higher than protecting the homeland. The 
U.S. Government must significantly increase the number of personnel 
available for border security by leveraging local law enforcement and 
increasing the ranks of the CBP. It must also place an increased emphasis 
on rapid response capabilities, intelligence-driven surge operations, 
proven technology, interagency coordination, and international coopera-
tion to act as force multipliers.
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